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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the effect of control of corruption on financial development using 
four aspects of financial development; depth, access, efficiency and stability. Previous 
studies have focused mainly on using corruption as an interaction term or using only 
one proxy for measuring financial development. Thus, this study adds new point of 
view to the current literature on corruption and financial development.  
Panel data used in this study consists of 13 countries and 15-year period from 2000 to 
2014. Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is seen as a suitable method for 
statistical analysis since it accounts the most common problems with panel data, the 
problem of endogeneity of explanatory variables and the problem with country-specific 
fixed-effects.  
The results show that control of corruption has significant and positive effect on 
financial depth and access. The effect stays persistent through robustness tests. Control 
variables compliment the effect on access while the effect on depth is even stronger 
when all the control variables are omitted. The results for efficiency are inconsistent, 
showing significance depending on the control variables used. Also the sign for the 
coefficient change with used control variables. Control of corruption seems to have 
significant impact on financial stability but the results are significant only when control 
variables are used.  
More work needs to be done to find the effect of control of corruption on financial 
efficiency. Control variables used in this study were not appropriate ones for measuring 
turn-over ratio in stock markets. Also, the results of this study can be supported by 
using other proxies of access, depth and stability. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Financial Development, Control of Corruption,  
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1   INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial development has an important role in the development of economies. Wide 
range of studies have recognized its positive effect on economic growth. However, the 
interpretation of financial development is not straightforward since it consists of various 
different determinants, none of which is supreme over every other. Thus, there does not 
exist a collective understanding on what determines financial development. Finding 
sufficient and universally agreed determinants is difficult since financial development 
does not show up in the same way in all economies. Countries with similar level of 
economic development can have differences between financial structures, one being 
bank-based and the other market-based. Also, the level of financial development may 
differ between countries with very similar economic conditions.  
 
The determinants of financial development become important when interest is on the 
functioning of financial system. For example, the unsustainable amount of private credit 
caused by the last financial crisis on 2007-2009 showed that it is important to 
understand how different factors affect to financial system. Knowing determinants of 
financial development can help financial systems to develop into more stable and 
sustainable direction, while ignoring the development of these determinants may cause 
serious problems to financial system. In the end, financial development is so important 
factor in economic development that risking it can lead to worse economic conditions. 
 
Widely known determinants of financial development are, according to Huang 2010, 
institutional, macroeconomic and geographic factors. Also wide range of other 
determinants exists. One of the determinants is control of corruption. Numerous studies 
show that the level of corruption has both direct and indirect effect to financial 
development. Corruption can for example increase bond spreads and prevent countries 
from undertaking productive projects (Ahlin and Pang (2008) Ciocchini, Durbin and Ng 
(2003)). The effect of corruption control is important especially in emerging countries. 
Their institutional quality is weaker so it does not protect country’s financial markets 
that well from the negative effects of corruption.  
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The earlier studies have focused using corruption, or control of corruption as an 
interaction term with financial development to study economic growth, or studied the 
straight relationship of financial development and corruption with only certain proxy for 
financial development. This kind of approach ignores the fact that financial system 
consists of multiple dimensions which can be affected by corruption in different ways.  
 
This study shows the effect of control of corruption on four dimensions of financial 
development; access, depth, efficiency and stability, and thus widens the base of studies 
focusing on the straight relationship of corruption and financial development. Its also 
adds approach where financial system development is seen as multidimensional and 
where corruption can have different effect on each dimension. This study includes four 
hypotheses, one for each dependent variable. The hypotheses are based on the results of 
previous studies concerning the relationship of control of corruption on financial 
development: 
 
H1: Control of corruption has positive effect on financial access, measured with market 
capitalization excluding top 10 largest companies to market capitalization, 
H2: Control of corruption has positive effect on financial depth, measured with stock 
market capitalization to GDP, 
H3: Control of corruption has positive effect on financial efficiency, measured with 
Stock market turn-over ratio, 
H4: Control of corruption has negative effect on financial stability, measured with stock 
market volatility. 
 
Based of the previous studies, control of corruption is expected to have positive effect 
on financial access, depth and efficiency and negative effect on stability since more 
stable financial markets are seen as more developed. Limitation for the study is caused 
by the size of the panel data which is not as large as it could be for depth and efficiency. 
For the comparability of the results, the sample size should be same for all estimations. 
This causes elimination of data for longer periods for depth and efficiency for the sake 
of access and stability.  
 9 
 
The data for this study consists of 13 upper and lower middle income countries and the 
time interval covers 15 years, from 2000 to 2014. Upper and lower middle income 
countries are combined into one group, middle income countries, to widen the amount 
of observations for valid research. To test the effect of control of corruption on financial 
development empirically, difference Generalized Method of Moments –method (GMM) 
is used. The estimation method accounts the most common problems related to panel 
data, country-specific fixed effects and endogeneity of explanatory variables.  
 
The results show that control of corruption has very significant and positive effect on 
financial access and depth. For depth, the effect stays persistently through robustness 
tests and even strengthens when all the control variables are omitted. Thus, the effect of 
control of corruption on financial depth does not rely on the complimentary effect of 
control variables. The effect for access also stays persistently through robustness tests 
but is complemented by control variables. As a conclusion, it can be said that results 
support the first and the second hypothesis. 
 
For financial efficiency finding more suitable control variables for turn-over ratio, or 
finding more suitable proxy for financial efficiency is required. Results are hard to 
interpret because the sign of the coefficient changes with estimations. The real effect of 
control of corruption on efficiency stays unclear. The results for stability support the 
fourth hypothesis partly. The coefficient of control of corruption is negative and 
significant in estimations, where one variable at a time is removed. Control variables 
seem to have complimentary effect on control of corruption since the effect of it 
becomes insignificant when all the control variables are omitted.  
 
The study continues with theory of financial development and dimensions of financial 
system. Third chapter represents the previous literature related to financial development 
and control of corruption. Also previous literature on financial development and control 
variables is represented. Fourth chapter introduces the data, fifth chapter the method 
used and sixth chapter the results. Seventh chapter includes discussion and the final 
chapter concludes.  
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2   FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The role of financial system is important for economic development. Various studies 
show that a positive effect exists between financial system development and economic 
growth. However, even if financial system development can be measured with various 
different proxies, the determination of financial development and how to develop 
financial markets is imperfectly understood.  
 
Economic development is mainly used as a sign of financial development. Thus, 
financial development has been seen as something that forwards economic growth. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) proposed the financial repression and financial 
development framework which has been used as a basis of financial market analysis and 
policy advice especially in developing countries. The McKinnon-Shaw model forms 
policy implication on the basis of financial repression. The policy implication is that 
government’s repressive policies, such as interest rate ceilings, high reserve 
requirements and credit control hold up financial development which in turn retards 
economic growth. Thus, the decision-making in financial system has an effect on 
economic growth through financial development. Various studies after McKinnon-Shaw 
model have also proven the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. Some of these studies are represented in chapter 3.2. Since financial 
development has a substantial role in economic growth it is highly important to 
understand the origins of it. 
 
Financial development is a complex entity which cannot be generalized for different 
economies. Nowadays, economists still lack complete understanding of what drives the 
emergence and development of financial markets and what are the reasons why 
different financial structures exist in countries with similar levels of economic 
development. Also, what causes the differences in the level of financial development in 
countries with similar income levels and geographic conditions has been under 
question. The determinants of financial development become important here. For the 
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last couple of decades, studies on potential determinants of financial development have 
increased.  
 
The legal and regulatory system is essential for financial development. La Porta, 
Florencio, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that legal traditions influence financial 
development through laws and enforcement mechanisms and the protection of the rights 
of the outside investors. Protection of property rights, contract enforcement and good 
accounting practices are part of legal and regulatory system, and they can have 
profound impact especially on the supply side of financial development. (Huang 2010: 
4-5). In addition, the study of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) highlights the 
importance of legal systems on financial development. It states that legal tradition is 
connected to financial development through two channels; political and legal 
adaptability channel. Political channel stresses that legal traditions differ in terms of the 
priority they give to private property rights. Private property rights are seen to form the 
basis of financial development.  
 
Legal adaptability channel implies that legal traditions are different by their abilities to 
adapt changing circumstances in commercial and financial fields, and that the legal 
systems which adapts these changing conditions more effectively will support financial 
development more effectively. The results of the study show that legal traditions explain 
cross-country differences in financial development and that legal adaptability has more 
advantages explaining financial development than political channel. Also Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) point out the importance of political systems on financial development 
policies. They state that compared to open political systems, closed political systems are 
more likely to threat institutionalization and prevent financial system development that 
promotes competition.  
 
The study of Beck et al. (2001) highlights the importance of legal tradition on financial 
development but also discusses about three alternative theories: politics and finance, 
culture and finance, and endowment. Politics and finance theory emphasizes the role of 
ruling groups and their power on choices which can affect financial development. 
Culture and finance theory highlights the importance of religious and cultural factors. 
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Also Stulz and Williamson (2003) argue that especially the views towards financial 
institutions are affected by religion.  
 
Macroeconomic determinants are policies which promote financial development. Lower 
inflation, financial liberalization and higher investment for example have effect on 
financial development. Important studies about inflation on financial development are 
represented on section 3.3. McKinnon-Shaw model presented above concludes that 
financial repression reduces the quantity and quality of aggregate investment through 
government’s repressive policies. Financial liberalization in turn can forward economic 
growth by increasing investment and its productivity. Chinn and Ito (2006) state that 
financial liberalization and especially financial openness is positively correlated with 
financial development. Law and Demetriades (2004) use various proxies for financial 
and trade openness to measure the effect of them to banking system and stock market 
development. They found simultaneously opening capital flows and trade encourages 
financial development. In addition, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) argue that trade 
openness influences financial development. Study of Falahaty and Hook (2011) states 
that improving quality of institutions, macroeconomic stability, inflation control and 
monetary policies, and privatizing banks can forward financial development in Middle 
East and North African countries. However, financial liberalization can also have some 
destabilizing effects. For example, opening up the stock market to foreign invertors can 
lead to more volatile stock returns and higher correlation with world market return 
(Bekaert, Campbell and Lumsdaine 2002).  
 
According to Huang (2010: 6-7) the correlation between geography and financial 
development is less studied compared to that for policy and institutions. Importance of 
geography for economic development is however noticed. The studies on correlation of 
economic development with geography is divided into three groups. First group 
emphasizes the correlation between latitude and economic development and argues that 
more tropical climates suffer from adverse ecological conditions. This can effect to the 
agricultural production. The second group states that the economic development of 
countries that are landlocked, distant from large markets or have only limited access to 
the delivery channels such as coasts and rivers is more vulnerable. This is because the 
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mentioned factors may limit the external trade, and cause difficulties when inputs for 
the production of manufactured goods need to be imported from distant markets.  
 
The last group focuses on resource endowment. Countries which have richer resources 
are more able to develop technologically and develop different export structures which 
help coping with external shocks. Huang also states that in general, geography is likely 
to have an effect on financial development through the demand side of financial 
development. However, the improved quality of institutions may also affect its supply 
side. For example, country’s ability to produce its agricultural goods with its own 
natural resources could reduce the demand for external finance, compared to other 
countries at similar level of GDP per capita. Also Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) state that geographic endowments effect to attitudes towards institutional 
development. For example places where high mortality rates were faced, settlement of a 
certain colony was not that likely. This retarded the development of institutions for that 
certain colony.  
 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the determinants of financial development are 
argued since different studies highlight different theories. In this chapter the goal was to 
represent some widely known determinants, but also some additional theories to show 
that financial development is not based on just few determinants, and that the 
emphasizing of determinants can differ by studies. The more research is made about the 
subject the more support certain theories gain. Since financial development is a complex 
entity, full agreement can, however, be hard to achieve. This study represents five 
commonly used determinants of financial development in chapter three. These are 
control of corruption, which is the main variable of interest, economic growth, inflation, 
income level and intermediary development. Excluding control of corruption, these are 
common and widely used determinants of financial development and thus selected as 
control variables for this study. 
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2.1   Dimensions of financial system 
 
Financial system has different dimensions. These dimension are important to take into 
account when finding determinants of financial development. The level of financial 
development can differ by countries due to differences between dimensions of 
countries’ financial systems. Global Financial Development Report (2013) argues that 
each dimension captures a different and separate side of financial system. Some 
determinants can be more important for measuring development of certain dimension, 
for example financial depth, and some other determinants more important for measuring 
other dimension, for example financial access. Dividing financial system into 
dimensions thus helps to recognize which determinants are important for measuring 
financial development in which dimension. Four characteristics of financial system 
presented by Cihak et al. (2015) are used to construct a comprehensive picture of the 
financial system. These four characteristics of financial system are: depth, access, 
efficiency, and stability. As Cihak et al. (2015) state in their study these four characters 
illustrate the multi-dimensional nature of financial system. 
 
 
2.1.1   Financial depth 
 
Financial depth refers to the size of the financial sector, including banks, other financial 
institutions, and financial markets in a country, compared to a measure of economic 
output. Financial depth reveals large disparities in financial systems around the globe. 
According to Global Financial Development Report.. (2013) the largest financial system 
is more than 34 500 times the smallest one. Even after rescaling with the GDP’s of the 
countries, the largest financial system is still 110 times the smallest one.  
 
Financial depth can be a separate measure for the size of the institutions and the size of 
the market but it can also be a measure for separating financial markets and institutions 
from each other. In other words, financial depth can be used to measure how bank or 
market based financial systems are. Bank based systems are said to be deeper than 
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market based systems and the measure can be used for measuring differences between 
financial systems. Bank based financial systems for example rebounded faster from the 
last financial crisis since they showed improvements in depth after the crisis. Global 
Financial Development Report… (2013: 33-35). 
 
Widely used proxy for financial depth is private credit relative to gross domestic 
product (GDP). Private credit excludes credit issued to governments, government 
agencies, and public enterprises. Financial depth is strongly linked to income level and 
economic development so that high income countries and developed economies tend to 
have deeper financial systems. However, measured with private credit to GDP bank-
based financial systems have naturally deeper financial sector than market-based 
systems since private credit is issued by deposit money banks. (Global Financial 
Development Report… 2013.)  
 
Levine and Zervos (1998) state that the greater the ability to trade ownership claims in 
the country the higher the economic development. This leads to the interest to measure 
the size of the stock and bond markets of the country. A common proxy to measure the 
relative size of a country’s financial market is its stock market capitalization to GDP 
plus outstanding volume of its private debt securities to GDP. Measured with this 
market based proxy, larger, and high income countries tend to have deeper financial 
system (Global Financial Development Report… 2013: 23-25).  
 
 
2.1.2   Financial access 
 
Financial access tells about the level of access to financial services. Well functioning 
financial access means that financial system effectively identifies and funds the 
potential firms and offers easy access to financial services for individuals. So, when 
financial depth measures the size of the financial system, financial access measures how 
equally the possibilities to use the system are divided. Groups that are are involuntarily 
excluded from the use of financial services are for example individuals and firms which 
do not have enough income or present a lending risk too high. Also discrimination, lack 
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of information and regulatory barriers are examples reasons for exclusion. (Global 
Financial Development Report… 2013: 25-27). 
 
In financial markets the access to stock and bond markets, in other words the degree of 
concentration tells about a country’s degree of financial access. Higher degree of 
concentration means that newer and smaller issuers face more difficulties when trying 
to access to financial markets. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) describe in their study how 
access to financial markets via credit rationing can be restricted and how credit 
rationing can cause worsening concentration. They state that increasing interest rates or 
increasing collateral requirements can lead to credit rationing since the loan portfolio of 
the bank would increase with the increasing amount of riskier investors who are chasing 
higher profits from interest. At times of high interest rates or increasing collateral 
requirements banks will decrease the number of loans made rather than limit the size of 
loans or charge higher interest rates from bigger loans.  
 
This kind of credit rationing leads to decreasing amount of credit in the market and 
prevents it to channel to profitable investment targets. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) also 
state that it might lead banks to select the most credit worthy customers they have and 
try to offer credit to them. This leads to even worse financial exclusion since only some 
selected ones have access to credit. However, because extending financial access with 
the expense of reducing screening and monitoring standards can cause severe negative 
outcomes for financial stability, interventions which remove market imperfections is 
more preferable way to develop financial access (Global Financial Development 
Report… 2013: 25-27).  
 
 
2.1.3   Financial efficiency 
 
Financial efficiency means that that a financial sector’s intermediating functions are 
performed in the least costly way possible. The lower the intermediation costs are the 
less costly the financial sector functions are to households, firms, and governments. 
Higher intermediary costs for institutions can be seen for example in net interest 
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margins, and lending-deposit spread. (Global Financial Development Report… 2013: 
27,28). In efficient financial system for example increasing amount of deposits in banks 
should lead to better liquidity and thus provide an opportunity to borrow more money 
and/or decrease the cost of borrowing.  
 
Tobin (1984) represents efficiency through four different concepts. First concept 
concerns market efficiency. If market is efficient, only insiders should be able to make 
money, since all the information that is publically available is already in the prices of 
tradable assets. According to the second concept, a market is efficient if prices of assets 
reflect their fundamental values. Thus, the price of an asset is based only on rational 
expectations of the payments on asset. Third concept, “full-insurance” efficiency states 
that financial markets are efficient if economic agents are able to insure the deliveries of 
goods and services for themselves despite all the possible future contingencies, by 
handovering some of their resources in the present time or contracting to deliver them in 
specified future time. Fourth concept, the most economic one, called functional 
efficiency refers to the ability of financial industries to provide mechanisms and 
networks of payments. Financial system should be able to mobilize savings for in a way 
that benefits the country. This includes investments in physical and human capital, 
domestic and foreign, private and public and allocation to socially productive uses.  
 
The proxies for efficiency in financial markets make strong assumptions about the 
behavior of investors and the functioning of financial markets. However, this is required 
to make this ambiguous dimension into a measurable form. According to Cihak, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2015) a basic proxy for efficiency in stock markets 
is the turnover ratio, the ratio of stock market’s annual turnover to its capitalization. The 
turnover ratio refers to increased liquidity which allows more efficient channeling of 
funds. If financial markets can produce higher turnover relative to capitalization 
investors should be more eager to invest and the trading volumes should increase. With 
higher trading volumes information should move to prices quicker and price discovery 
should be more effortless. Efficiency in bond markets can be seen for example from the 
tightness of bid-ask spread. Wider spread prevents efficient price discovery and 
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discourages to trading since intermediary costs are higher (Global Financial 
Development Report… 2013: 27,28).  
 
 
2.1.4   Financial stability 
 
The last dimension of financial system is financial stability. It is a dimension which has 
been under vast discussion since the 2008 financial crisis. The loose borrowing policies 
without proper risk management and loan monitoring caused a world wide financial 
crisis which caused for example failures of various banks and insolvency of mortgage 
customers since the demands for payments of loans became unbearable. Also economic 
growth and overall trust to the banking system decreased. Global Financial 
Development Report (2013: 37, 38) for example show that volatility in financial 
markets has increased between years 2008 and 2010 versus years 2000-2007. It might 
not be surprising that for example institutional development, measured with domestic 
credit to private sector as a % of GDP, can forward volatility, and thus development of 
one dimension can lead to problems in one dimension. One good example is the rapid 
growth of China in the 2000s. When viewing the size of the financial institutions, the 
depth scores were high and China’s financial system seemed developed. However, the 
credit growth in the country was too rapid, which caused dramatic decrease in stability. 
The overall picture of the level of Chinese financial system development was therefore 
not that promising. 
 
If the financial intermediaries only focus on developing size (depth) and inclusion 
(access), and do not spend money on monitoring the outflow of loans (efficiency) the 
financial stability can be in danger. This can result into wider financial crisis and can 
disturb economic growth.  
 
The most used proxy for financial stability is the z-score. Its has a direct link with the 
probability of default which makes it so widely used. It is defined as the sum of capital 
to assets and return on assets, divided by the standard deviation of return on assets. 
Thus, z-score compares capitalization and returns with the risk they bear. (Global 
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Financial Development Report… 2013: 28-30). Also excessive credit growth has been 
found to be associated with banking crises according to for example Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) and IMF (2004). When income level does not keep up in pace with the 
growing amount of debt of firms and households, nonperforming loans and defaults 
eventually start to increase. The more banks have default and nonperforming loan 
customers the more likely the country will end up in banking crisis.  
 
In financial markets, market volatility tells about the financial stability of a country 
(Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine 2015). Market volatility tells about the 
amount of uncertainty investors have about the size of changes in securities value traded 
in markets. Large volatility tells about high uncertainty about the real fundamental value 
of security which increases the risk investors bear. During times of financial and 
economic instability stock market volatility tends to increase visibly (Schwert 2011) 
which makes it a good measure of financial stability.  
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3   PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
This chapter represents previous literature related to the subject of this study. Studies 
about the relationship between corruption and financial development are represented. 
Because financial market development is not a result of just one factor, various other 
factors which affect to it are also represented. These factors work as control variables in 
this study. 
 
 
3.1   Control of corruption and financial development 
 
Studies have shown that the level of corruption has an effect on financial development. 
Studies focus mostly on the effect of corruption and financial development on economic 
growth and thus use interaction of corruption and financial development. There exist 
also few studies which try to explain financial development with the level of corruption.  
 
Most of these studies focus on studying the effect on emerging countries. Ahlin and 
Pang (2008) found that both, financial development and low corruption forward the 
undertaking of productive projects. However, they work as substitutes since corruption 
raises liquidity needs and thus makes financial improvements more potent. Financial 
underdevelopment in turn makes corruption more troublesome and thus reducing it 
becomes more beneficial. For example, using financial development and lack of 
corruption as two factors influencing growth, the growth gains of countries and 
industries associated with moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in one factor are 
0,63-1,68 percentage points higher if the other factor is at the 25th percentile rather that 
the 75th.  
 
Ayaydin and Baltaci (2013) studied the effects of corruption level and banking sector 
development on stock market, and for this purpose they created an interaction term from 
these two independent variables. They found a strong negative relationship between 
interaction term and stock market development. Since banking sector development and 
 21 
stock market development are complementaries the results show that the negative effect 
of corruption outweighs the positive effect of banking sector development and thus is 
more important factor when focusing on improving institutional quality, and through 
that developing stock markets.  
 
Also Bahmani-Oskooee, Kholdy and Sohrabian (2013) show in their study that 
corruption can have indirect effect on financial development. According to the study, 
the investment flows of multinational companies seem to stimulate the financial markets 
of emerging countries more in countries that are more corrupted. However, Chinn and 
Ito (2006) find that controlling corruption in emerging markets fosters the development 
of equity markets. This is because lower levels of corruption increase the effect of 
financial opening in fostering equity market development. These results show that 
corruption can have different effects on different dimensions of financial markets. 
 
The study of Ciocchini, Durbin and Ng (2003) shows the cost of corruption from the 
investors’ point of view in emerging markets. They found that corruption increases 
bond spreads since countries that are seen more corrupted must pay a higher risk 
premium when issuing bonds. Cherif and Gazadar (2010) and Yartey (2010) find a 
negative relationship between corruption and stock market development. However, this 
relationship is insignificant.  
 
 
3.2   Economic growth and financial development 
 
Several studies have shown that many aspects of financial development affect economic 
growth in developing and developed countries. Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) suggest 
that creating financial stability and aiming to modest inflation, forwards investment 
flow to country and thus, helps to create resources for economic growth. Odedokun 
(1998) shows that growth of financial aggregates affects positively on economic growth 
in developing countries. Further, low income developing countries seem to benefit from 
financial deepening, defined as the financial aggregates in relation to overall economic 
activities or GDP. Raghuram and Zingales (1998) show that financial development 
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forwards industrial growth, which leads to economic growth. It reduces the cost of 
external finance and thus, compared to countries which lack well-developed market, it 
brings comparative advantage in industries that are more dependent on external finance. 
Beck and Levine (2004) studied financial development as a whole measuring stock 
market development and financial institutions’ development. They found that the 
development of stock markets and banks both have an impact on economic growth 
across different countries.  
 
Even if the association between financial development and economic growth exists it is 
not straightforward. Levine (1997) argues that the link is not simple and requires 
understanding the evolution and functioning of financial systems in various levels, such 
as in firm and industry level. To understand the linkage one has to also understand 
nonfinancial development, such as changes in telecommunications and in legal system 
and their effects to financial system.  
 
Even if various studies support the association of financial development to economic 
growth the direction of causality is argued. Study by Patrick (1966) identifies two 
possible patterns in this causal relationship. First pattern is demand following, which 
means demand for financial sector services which is a consequence of real economic 
growth. Second pattern is supply leading which means that financial institutions and 
their services are created for the needs of entrepreneurs in growth-inducing sectors. 
Thus, entrepreneurs create the demand in financial sector, not the economic growth. 
Also Kar et al. (2011) studied the direction of causality for fifteen MENA countries and 
found that the direction is sensitive to the measurement of financial development and 
differs between countries.  
 
 
3.3   Inflation and financial market development 
 
Many studies have shown that there is a link between high rates of inflation and 
financial development. Common finding of the studies is that permanent increase in 
inflation has a negative effect on the long-run rate of real growth or on long-run level of 
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real activity. Theoretical literature suggests that permanently increasing inflation 
disturbs the financial sector of a country and complicates the effective allocation of 
resources. Further, the high levels of inflation affect credit market frictions in financial 
markets as a whole lowering the performance of banking sector and equity markets.  
 
The inflation drives down the real rate of return on money and assets in general. The 
reduction in real rates of return exacerbates credit market frictions which leads to credit 
rationing. Credit rationing in turn leads to decrease in given loans, less efficient 
resource allocation, and diminishing intermediary activity. (Huybens and Smith 1998, 
1999). The models of Azariadis and Smith (1996) show that countries with high initial 
inflation rates do suffer from credit rationing and decreasing long-run output levels. In 
countries where the initial inflation rates are low the inflation in turn does not cause 
credit rationing. Also Rousseau and Yilmazkuday (2009) find that higher level of 
financial development combined with low-inflation forwards financial deepening. 
Burger and Warnock (2006) state that stable inflation rates can ensure more developed 
bond markets and make country to rely more on domestic bonds. 
 
The study of Boyd, Levine and Smith (2000) shows how inflation affects to banking 
sector activity, and to the rates of return on stocks, using data from 100 countries over 
45-year period. The bank lending activity and stock market development seem to 
rapidly diminish when inflation increases. Study also shows that when inflation rates 
exceed 15 percent limit there can be seen a discrete drop in financial sector activity. 
Inflation also effects to stock market development according to Naceur, Ghazouani, and 
Omran (2005). They studied stock market development in MENA region and found that 
inflation has a negative and significant impact to stock market capitalization. 
 
Kim and Lin (2010) study the link between inflation and financial development, using 
measures of financial depth on short- and long-run. They collected data from 87 
countries over the period 1960-2005 and found that inflation has negative long-run 
effects on financial development. However short-run effects are either significantly or 
insignificantly positive depending on the income-level of the country. The financial 
development of low income countries benefits from the short-run inflation when the 
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effect is insignificant in high income countries. This long-term result is consistent with 
the results of the above mentioned studies. 
 
 
3.4   Income level and financial market development 
 
Many studies have shown that real income level is an important predictor for stock 
market development. The study of Yartey (2008) shows that a percentage point increase 
in GDP per capita increases stock market development by 7,23 percentage point. Garcia 
and Liu (1999) found that when income level increases by one billion dollars, market 
capitalization shows significant increase of 0,007 percentage points. Also Cherif and 
Gazar (2010) found that income level is an important determinant of stock market 
development. In nine regressions out of ten the last year’s income level is a significant 
variable at 5% level when T-test is used. 
 
Income level is also an important determinant in bond market development. Ağca, De 
Nicolò, and Detragiache (2007) find that the more developed the country is, measured 
with GDP per capita, and the more developed its financial markets and intermediaries 
are, the more firms rely on debt. 
 
 
3.5   Intermediary development and financial market development 
 
Financial intermediary development has a positive and significant effect on financial 
market development. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) found that as countries reach 
middle income level, stock markets and nonbank financial intermediaries start to 
increase their share of the financial system, and banks start to represent a smaller share 
of the financial system. When financial intermediaries develop also stock markets 
continue developing which leads to a conclusion that stock markets and financial 
intermediaries can be seen as compliments as they seem to grow simultaneously.  
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Also, Garcia and Liu (1999) state that banking sector and stock market are 
complements. They found high and significant correlation between stock market 
capitalization and two proxies of financial intermediary development: domestic credit to 
private sector as a % of GDP (correlation 0,66), and liquid liabilities as a % of GDP 
(correlation 0,73). Cherif and Gazdar (2010) also find the complementary relationship 
in MENA region. They found that when domestic credit to private sector increases by 
one percentage point, stock market capitalization, measured by domestic credit to the 
private sector as a % of GDP, increases by 1,22 percentage points. 
 
The complementary relationship exists also between bond markets and intermediary 
development. Figure 9 in the study of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) 
shows that when domestic debt securities increase also domestic credit provided by 
banking sector increase. Ağca, De Nicolò, and Detragiache (2007) find that the more 
developed the financial intermediaries in are in a country the more firms rely on debt, 
which in turn increases the issued credit in a country. Banks act as dealers and market 
makers in bond market which highlights the important role of them when developing 
liquid and well-functioning bond market. Thus, it is logical that bond market 
development and intermediary development are complements rather than substitutes.  
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4   DATA 
 
The sample pool consists of 13 middle income countries and 15-year time period from 
2000 to 2014. Thus, the data is treated as panel data. The countries are Brazil, China, 
Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand and Turkey. World Bank classifies all the countries in the world into 
four categories based on their income level: High income, high middle income, low 
middle income, and low income. All the target countries in this study represent lower 
and upper middle income countries and together these two income groups can be seen 
as one group for middle income countries. 
 
The data of lower and upper middle income countries is combined since separately they 
do not hold enough data for a valid research on all four dimensions of financial 
development. Also, it can be said that in high income countries financial systems have 
already developed to such point where they are developing in a slower and more stable 
pace. When certain level of financial development is achieved, improvements in the 
system through time are not as visible anymore as in countries with lower levels of 
development. Thus, lower income countries can show more dramatic changes trough 
time and provide more significant and interesting results.  
 
Using only one income group as a sample pool allows more reliable interpretation of 
results. Combining all income groups into one sample pool would lead to biased results 
since country specific features of high- and low income countries most probably would 
differ dramatically. So many unobservable factors would have to be taken into account 
that the results would be hard to interpret. Using middle income countries as a sample 
pool allows the analyzing to focus more on the actual variable of interest, the control of 
corruption, and does not leave so much unobservable factors to be taken into account.  
 
The data for all the other variables except for control of corruption is from World Bank 
Global Financial Development Database from June 2016. The dataset provides 
information on the financial development indicators for all the countries in the world. 
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The data for control of corruption is from The World Wide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) from year 2015 which is provided by World Bank. WGI is a dataset which 
summarizes the views on the quality of governance in industrial and developing 
countries.  
 
 
4.1   Variables 
 
To study the link between four dimensions of financial market development and control 
of corruption four dependent variables are used. One for each dimension, to build 
separate estimations on each dimension. The independent variable of interest is control 
of corruption and three other independent variables are used as control variables. The 
proxies for financial market focus on stock markets since the data for bond markets is 
occasionally limited. Also, including bond markets to the study would make the 
regressions used more complex since more control variables should be used. Further, 
control of corruption might affect to stock and bond markets differently so there should 
be separate regressions for both to come out with valid analysis. Because already four 
different dimensions are analyzed, making separate regressions for bond and stock 
markets would increase the amount of regressions so much that the bond markets are 
left out of this study, and for further topic of research. 
 
 
4.1.1   Dependent variables 
 
In this study, stock market capitalization to GDP is a proxy for financial markets depth. 
It is the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP and thus 
works as a valid indicator for the size of financial markets. Higher values of the proxy 
indicate about larger, and thus deeper, stock markets. For measuring financial access, 
market capitalization excluding top 10 largest companies to market capitalization is 
used. It is a variable which shows how concentrated the financial markets are. The 
proxy is suggested by Global Financial Development report (Global Financial 
Development Report… 2013: 23). Higher values of the proxy indicate better access for 
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smaller companies to stock market since the largest companies do not then hold as 
significant part of the market capitalization. Small values would indicate about 
concentrated stock markets. A higher degree of concentration means that it is harder for 
companies to access to financial markets.  
 
Stock market turn-over ratio is a proxy for financial efficiency in this study. It 
represents the total value of shares traded during one-year period divided by the average 
market capitalization for the period. Turn-over ratio refers to increased liquidity which 
allows more efficient channeling of funds, which should lead to increased trading 
volumes and, in the end, to better price discovery. Thus higher values of the proxy 
signal about better efficiency in the stock market.  
 
A proxy for financial stability is stock price volatility. It is a measure of average of the 
360-day volatility of the national stock market index. It signals about the overall 
expectations on companies and via that, expectations on stability. Financially developed 
countries have developed ways to control for instability and thus should have more 
stable financial markets. Values of the proxy decreasing over time should then signal of 
financial development. However, as noticed during the last financial crisis, even the 
most developed countries cannot protect their stock markets from high volatility. 
 
The above mentioned proxies hold the most data in the dataset which makes them 
favorable choices in addition to the reasons stated above. The proxies are crude 
measures of financial development and for example, turnover ratio might include other 
information which is not straightly related to efficiency. However, when measuring 
financial development in a cross-country analysis, these proxies provide a good 
directional information. 
 
 
4.1.2   Independent variable of interest 
 
The independent variable of interest, provided by The World Wide Governance 
Indicators (WGI), is control of corruption, an estimate of how the public power is 
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exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption. It also 
captures the state of elites and private interests. The variable ranges from approximately 
-2,5 to 2,5, where negative value represents weak governance performance and positive 
represents strong governance. The variable is built using six representative sources and 
sixteen non-representative sources. Different sources provide information about 
corruption, such as corruption among different groups and frequency of corruption, as 
well as information about the control of corruption, such as accountability, anti-
corruption policy, and transparency. (Control of Corruption 2015). Since, according to 
previous studies, control of corruption has positive effect on financial development, the 
values of proxies of financial development are expected to increase with the 
independent variable. However, as Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2013) argue, financial 
markets can develop faster in more corrupted countries. Thus, negative effect of control 
of corruption on financial development might not be a surprising result.  
 
 
4.1.3   Control variables 
 
Economic growth and income level are included as control variables, since larger, and 
high income countries tend to have deeper financial systems. (Global Financial 
Development Report… 2013: 23-25). Size is a relevant control variable also for 
financial access and efficiency based on the research of Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, 
and Levine (2015) since countries like China and India score in the top quartile for 
financial market access. Countries with better financial efficiency are large developing, 
and developed countries such as Europe, China, India, and North America. The control 
variable for country size is GDP. GDP per capita as a proxy for income level 
development.  
 
As previous studies show, including financial intermediary development as one of the 
determinants is important when measuring financial market development. In this study 
domestic credit to private sector as a % of GDP is used since it measures the 
development of the role of banks in providing long-term financing. It is also a better 
proxy for financial intermediary development compared to other widely used proxy, 
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broad money (M3) supply to GDP, which measures the size of the size of the banking 
sector in a country (Cherif and Gazdar 2010, Naceur, Ghazouani, and Omran 2005). 
 
According to previous literature also inflation has significant effect on financial markets 
development. The measure for inflation is a country level year average of Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) which measures price change from the perspective of the purchaser. 
CPI measures the annual price change of goods and services which makes it reliable and 
relevant measure of inflation. The data is from World Bank Financial Development 
database. The base year of the index is 2010.  
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4.2   Descriptive statistics 
 
This chapter first presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables. Second, correlations between dependent and independent variables are shown 
to build expectations on estimates. Third, diagnostics for multicollinearity are shown to 
prove the validity of used independent variables. The descriptive statistics are shown for 
middle income countries as one group in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Table 2 shows correlations between dependent and independent variables. According to 
Evans (1996) correlation is moderate if it varies between 0,40-0,59, strong if it varies 
between 0,60-0,79 and very strong between 0,80-1,0. According to Table 2 the control 
of corruption is expected to have positive effect on financial development from the 
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 189 52,75 14,33 18,18 92,84
Depth 195 59,79 52,30 7,27 256,50
Efficiency 195 57,07 58,70 2,47 313,18
Stability 193 23,10 8,79 7,77 64,34
Control of 
corruption 169 -0,26 0,32 -1,13 0,61
Inflation 195 87,35 21,51 19,28 140,36
Income 195 3786,00 2383,00 572,06 8865,00
Log GDP 195 26,54 1,29 23,43 29,93
Institutional 
development 195 59,68 43,49 13,45 160,13
Descriptive statistics
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aspects of depth, access and stability. Correlation of control of corruption with 
dependent variables is highest for depth showing moderate positive correlation. In 
contrast, control of corruption is expected to have negative impact on efficiency. 
However, the correlation is moderate. Based on previous studies control of corruption 
should have positive effect on financial development which is why the third hypothesis 
expects positive correlation. Because the correlation is only moderate, the expectation 
for the coefficient follows the third hypothesis. 
 
Based on previous studies inflation should have negative correlation with dependent 
variables since increasing inflation is shown to be harmful for financial development. 
However, for access and depth the correlation is positive, although low, which indicates 
that inflation might also be beneficiary for financial development. Interestingly income 
level has negative correlation with access. However, the correlation is not strong. For 
depth, efficiency and stability the coefficient is expected to be positive. Highest 
correlation, although moderate, with GDP exists on efficiency and the correlations with 
all dependent variables are positive. Thus, the coefficients for GPD are expected to be 
positive. As mentioned earlier the bigger the country is, the more developed the 
financial markets usually are. GDP is shown in logarithmic form for clarity. 
Institutional development shows strong correlation with access and depth so the 
coefficient is strongly expected to be positive. Correlations with stability and efficiency 
are low but the signs are as expected according to previous studies, positive for 
efficiency and negative for stability.  
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Table 2. Correlations – Independent and dependent variables 
 
 
It is appropriate to test variables for possible multicollinearity. Multicollinearity arises if 
the correlation between two independent variables is near to unity. This makes the 
variances of the independent variables inflated. Multicollinearity may lead to lack of 
statistical significance of individual independent variable and thus estimation and 
interpretation of its coefficient becomes problematic.  
 
Multicollinearity is tested by Eigensystem analysis of correlation matrix. The analysis 
provides eigenvalues and condition numbers for variables. Eigenvalues (!". . . !$)  are 
defined through correlation matrix. The corresponding condition number of correlation 
matrix is defined as the square root of the ratio of maximum eigenvalue of the matrix to 
each individual eigenvalue: 
 !" = $√('()*'j ),  j = 1,2,…,p, 
 
Control of 
corruption
Inflation Income Log GDP
Institutional 
development
Access 0.12183
(0.1190)
165
0.14653
(0.0442)
189
-0.16923
(0.0199)
189
0.27882
(0.0001)
189
0.62306
 (<.0001)
     189
Depth 0.53903
(<.0001)
169
0.23790
(0.0008)
195
0.27254
(0.0001)
195
0.04045
(0.5745)
195
0.73425
 (<.0001) 
    195
Efficiency -0.06004
(0.4381)
169
-0.07664
(0.2869)
195
0.06410
(0.3733)
195
0.52567
(<.0001)
195
0.20558 
(0.0039)     
195
Stability -0.14624
(0.0586)
168
-0.38274
(<.0001)
193
0.03573
(0.6218)
193
0.18317
(0.0108)
193
-0.22712
 (0.0015)  
    193
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p -values.
The last row for each correlation is the number of observations.
Pearson Correlation Coefficients - Dependent variable with independent variable
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where K is the condition number of correlation matrix. (Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch 
1980).  
 
According to Belsey et al, if eigenvalue is close to zero and the corresponding condition 
number of a variable is around 10, regression estimates might be affected by 
dependencies. Values larger than 100 indicate multicollinearity. For each variable, also 
the proportions of the variances of the estimates are accounted. Collinearity can be a 
problem when a variable associated with a high condition index contributes strongly to 
the variance of two or more variables. As can be seen from Table 3, none of the 
independent variables have large condition values (column Condition Index). Thus, they 
do not suffer from multicollinearity and can be used in the same regression. 
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Table 3. Collinearity Diagnostics - Eigensystem analysis of correlation matrix. 
 
 
Control of 
Corruption Inflation Income Log GDP 
Institutional 
development
1 1,9241 1,0000 0,0531 0,0458 0,0725 0,0280 0,0754
2 1,3836 1,1793 0,0751 0,1776 0,0101 0,1795 0,0003
3 0,8625 1,4936 0,0005 0,0113 0,1918 0,0515 0,4074
4 0,6402 1,7336 0,0039 0,7389 0,0007 0,3274 0,0854
5 0,1895 3,1866 0,8675 0,0265 0,7250 0,4137 0,4315
Control of 
Corruption Inflation Income Log GDP 
Institutional 
development
1 1,9338 1,0000 0,0518 0,0499 0,0716 0,0296 0,0747
2 1,3762 1,1854 0,0803 0,1676 0,0126 0,1813 0,0004
3 0,8566 1,5025 0,0007 0,0042 0,1998 0,0456 0,4132
4 0,6409 1,7370 0,0021 0,7405 0,0001 0,3490 0,0643
5 0,1925 3,1694 0,8652 0,0378 0,7159 0,3945 0,4474
Control of 
Corruption Inflation Income Log GDP 
Institutional 
development
1 1,9338 1,0000 0,0518 0,0499 0,0716 0,0296 0,0747
2 1,3762 1,1854 0,0803 0,1676 0,0126 0,1813 0,0004
3 0,8566 1,5025 0,0007 0,0042 0,1998 0,0456 0,4132
4 0,6409 1,7370 0,0021 0,7405 0,0001 0,3490 0,0643
5 0,1925 3,1694 0,8652 0,0378 0,7159 0,3945 0,4474
Control of 
Corruption Inflation Income Log GDP 
Institutional 
development
1 1,9250 1,0000 0,0529 0,0485 0,0728 0,0286 0,0752
2 1,3774 1,1822 0,0787 0,1708 0,0114 0,1838 0,0004
3 0,8587 1,4973 0,0006 0,0045 0,1986 0,0443 0,4163
4 0,6465 1,7255 0,0021 0,7369 0,0001 0,3484 0,0631
5 0,1925 3,1626 0,8657 0,0394 0,7172 0,3950 0,4450
Access
Number Eigenvalue ConditionIndex
Proportion of Variation
Stability
Number Eigenvalue ConditionIndex
Proportion of Variation
Depth
Number Eigenvalue ConditionIndex
Proportion of Variation
Efficiency
Collinearity Diagnostics (intercept adjusted) 
Number Eigenvalue ConditionIndex
Proportion of Variation
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5   METHODOLOGY 
 
The link between financial market development and control of corruption is studied 
using panel data which covers data for upper middle income and lower middle income 
countries for the period of 2000-2014. The goal is to empirically show if control of 
corruption can explain the variation of financial development in upper middle income 
and lower middle income countries. Panel data enables to take into account the 
development of control of corruption over time in a country level and study if it has 
effect on a country’s financial market development. Four dimensions of financial 
development (access, depth, efficiency, and stability) are used to account the effect of 
control of corruption. This allows to see if the control of corruption effects to 
dimensions individually and separate which dimensions of financial development are 
affected most by control of corruption. 
 
 
5.1   Arellano – Bond difference GMM estimator 
 
The simplest way to study the effect of independent variable on dependent variable is to 
use simple Ordinary Lear Squares (OLS) regression method where variable of interest 
and group of control variables are regressed on independent variable. However, for 
dynamic panels OLS is not appropriate method since several econometric problems may 
arise due to the inclusion of time. The first problem is endogeneity. Possible unobserved 
heterogeneity may arise from omitted variables in the error term, which consists of 
country-specific effects and observation-specific errors. The direction of causality with 
independent variable and regressors may be unclear and thus independent variables may 
be correlated with error term. Also, country-specific characteristics, also known as fixed 
effects, which are included in the error term, may be correlated with independent 
variables. The effect of long-term unobservable country-specific factors and 
endogeneity of independent variables have to be accounted. (Roodman 2009). 
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Using fixed-effects estimation technique, for example two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
method, to account these problems would be appropriate since it uses exogenous 
variables, called as instrumental variables to create new exogenous variables in place of 
endogenous variables. Instrumental variable is a variable not correlated with error term 
but correlated to the explanatory variable correlating with error term and thus, 
exogenous. Plugging the new variable, created by instrumental variable, into the 
regression, in place of the endogenous variable, should solve the endogeneity problem. 
However, dynamic endogeneity might occur. The values of independent variables at 
time t will probably be related to the values of dependent variable at time s < t. Thus, 
standard fixed-effects model might not be the best solution. (Roodman 2009). 
 
Also, more needs to be accounted for considering appropriate model for dynamic panel 
data. Models used for estimating relationship of independent variable and independent 
variable through time tend to include lagged dependent variable to account the effect of 
the dependent variable itself to its future values. The problem with including lagged 
dependent variable is that it gives rise to autocorrelation. Autocorrelation tells about the 
tendency of observations made at different time points to be related to one another. The 
last problem with panel dataset is that it might cover short time dimension (T) and 
larger amount of observable targets (N). In large-T panels, shocks to the country-
specific factors shown in the error term will decline with time when small-T panels 
suffer more from the shocks shown in the error term. (Roodman 2009). 
 
To account the above-mentioned problems, the Arellano – Bond (1991) difference 
GMM estimation method first proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1998) is 
used. It accounts the endogeneity problem by making endogenous independent variables 
predetermined. This happens by using lagged levels of the endogenous regressors as 
instruments in addition to exogenous instruments. This way the endogenous variables 
become predetermined and not correlated with the error term in the used equation. To 
account the problem of country-specific factors affecting explanatory variables 
difference GMM uses first-differences. The basic regression with lagged dependent 
variable  
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!"# = %&!"#'( +%*'"#, +%∆."#   
 
becomes Δ"#$ = &'∆"#$)* +&∆,'#$. +&∆/#$   
 
by the first-differencing. X’ represents all the explanatory variables. Also the error term 
is differenced which makes the fixed effect removed since it does not vary with time. 
The error term can be expressed as 
 !"# = %&" +%("#   
 
and after differencing 
 !"#$%!",#$' = )"$%)" + +"#$%+",#$' = % +"#$%+",#$' 
 
 
or Δ"#$   since the country-specific effect is zero. Since differencing removes the 
country’s fixed effect, the above-mentioned problem with small-T large-N panels does 
not occur anymore. Finally, first-differencing the lagged dependent variable removes 
possible autocorrelation.  
 
As stated, GMM method requires instrumental variables to be used. Instrumental 
variables are needed when the correlation between independent and dependent variable 
does not account the causal relationship of them. Instrumental variable helps to reveal 
the causal effect by causing changes in the independent variable while having no 
independent effect on the dependent variable. Appropriate instrumental variables should 
be correlated with the endogenous regressors and orthogonal to the errors. 
Orthogonality is present if the residuals of the model of interest are uncorrelated with 
the instrumental variables used. This means that there is no information available in 
residual that could be used to test the wanted hypothesis. The endogenous variables can 
be used as instruments with proper lags. Two or more lags of the variables are required 
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so they are not correlated with current error term. The first lag is correlated with error 
term through first-differencing 
 ∆"#,%&' = )"#,%&'&)"#,%&*  .
 
since the differenced current error term includes first lag of country-specific effect 
 ∆"#$ = &"#$'&"#,$')  .
 
The second lag is correlated with the first lag of the differenced error term but not with 
the current differenced error term. Thus, second lags of differenced endogenous 
variables can be used as instruments. (Roodman 2009). 
 
In this study all the independent variables are considered endogenous since none of 
them cannot be seen as strictly exogenous. All the independent variables are suitable for 
instruments after taking second lags. Thus, in the GMM estimation for this study, 
second lags of the independent variables are used as instruments. In the estimation, two-
step estimator is calculated. This means that the standard covariance matrix is robust to 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity that is panel-specific. The model used for GMM 
analysis is following:  
 !"#$%&' = )&' + +,∆!"#$%&,'/, + +0∆1231245&' + +6∆!"#74$&'+ +8∆!"#74129:&' + +;∆!"#<%=&' + +;∆!"#745%:>&' +?@&' .  
 
Where FD is one of the proxies for financial development (access, depth, efficiency or 
stability), CORCONT is the level of control of corruption, INF is inflation, INCOME is 
income level, GDP is gross domestic product and INTDEV institutional development. 
All the variables except control of corruption are transformed info logarithmic form for 
reducing variance. Control of corruption gets only values between range of -2,5 – 2,5, 
so due to small range and negative values, it is not reasonable to transform it into 
logarithmic form. 
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5.2   Sargan test for over-identification 
 
Sargan test is used for testing if the instruments used in the model are jointly valid. Null 
hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to residuals (exogenous). 
If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected it can be said that the model is identified. In 
other words, the instruments used are valid. The test result is computed from residuals 
from regression of instrumental variables. The model is said to be identified if the 
amount of used appropriate instruments and endogenous variables is the same. Over-
identified model would have residuals correlated with instrumental variables and thus 
the amount of appropriate instruments would be greater than the amount of endogenous 
regressors.  
 
If the model has too many instruments reducing the amount of lags used helps since 
instrument is used for every lag. If the model is over-identified and the minimum 
amount of two lags is used, the amount of instruments can also be reduced by reducing 
the amount of endogenous variables. This of course is not preferable if all the control 
variables are seen as important for the estimation. For the model to pass the Sargan test 
the null cannot be rejected and thus higher p-values are preferable. (Roodman 2009). 
 
 
5.3   Test for autocorrelation 
 
Autocorrelation occurs if observations made at different time points are related to one 
another. Test for autocorrelation is appropriate since the model used includes lagged 
dependent variable. This can cause the errors included in the lagged differenced 
dependent variable to be correlated with the errors included in the differenced 
dependent variable. Since current differenced error is mathematically related to first lag 
of differenced error due to shared term of error in first lag, first-order serial correlation 
is expected in differences.  
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To confirm that first-order serial correlation does not exist in levels, second-order 
correlation in differences has to be checked. Second-order correlation in differences 
would mean that correlation exists between !",$%&  in ∆"#$    and !",$%&  in ∆"#,%&'  .
Assumption in the test for autocorrelation is that errors are not correlated across 
individuals. Positive autocorrelation would mean that increase in one time-series leads 
to an increase in the other time-series. Negative autocorrelation means that increase in 
one time-series causes decrease in the other time series. The test results for 
autocorrelation are reported as AR(1) for first-order autocorrelation and AR(2) for 
second-order autocorrelation. (Roodman 2009). 
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6   RESULTS 
 
According to various studies corruption can have effect on financial development. 
Mainly studies argue that corruption has negative effect on financial development but 
also opposing views exist. Most of the earlier studies have focused using corruption or 
control of corruption as an interaction term with financial development to study 
economic growth. Studies about straight relationship of financial development and 
corruption use only certain proxy for financial development. This kind of approach 
ignores the fact that financial system consists of multiple dimensions which might be 
affected by corruption in different ways.  
 
This study shows the effect of control of corruption on four dimensions of financial 
development and thus widens the base of studies focusing on the straight relationship of 
corruption and financial development. Its also adds approach where financial system 
development is seen as multidimensional and where corruption can have different effect 
on each dimension. This chapter represents the results of difference GMM estimation of 
control of corruption on financial development, where four dimensions of financial 
system (access, depth, efficiency and stability) are recognized and proxies of these are 
used as dependent variables for measuring the financial development in 13 middle 
income countries through years 2000-2014.  
 
It was noticed during the tests that using all the control variables causes Sargan test to 
have p-value close to unity which may signal about problem of too many instruments. 
Significant Sargan test p-value signals about same problem. Limiting the lag depth or 
limiting the amount of variables instrumented are the most common solutions 
(Roodman 2009). Limiting the lag depth does not work as a solution since the minimum 
of two lags is already used so the amount of variables instrumented has to be reduced. 
Since GDP and GDP per capita are usually highly correlated variables, even if no 
multicollinearity is detected, another one is omitted for the sake of the estimation to 
succeed. In this study, income level is omitted. Tables 4 to 8 show the results for 
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difference GMM estimation for each dependent variable. They also show test results for 
autocorrelation and Sargan test. 
 
 
6.1   Access 
 
Table 4 shows that control of corruption has very significant and positive effect on 
market capitalization excluding top 10 companies to market capitalization (access). This 
supports the first hypothesis and the expectations based on correlations, stated earlier in 
this study. Also inflation has significant and positive effect on access showing that it 
can surprisingly forward financial development. The coefficients for GDP and 
institutional development are significant (institutional development only in 10% level) 
but negative, which is surprising since growth and the growth of domestic credit to 
private sector are expected to forward financial development. The model passes the 
Sargan test of appropriate amount of instruments and also the test for no autocorrelation 
in differences and levels.  
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Table 4. Difference GMM estimation results for access. 
 
 
6.2   Depth 
 
Table 5 shows that control of corruption has highly significant effect on stock market 
capitalization to GDP (depth). The effect is positive which was expected. Also the 
coefficients of lagged depth, inflation and GDP are significant and positive as expected. 
Institutional development does not have significant effect on depth which is somewhat 
Difference GMM estimates
Explanatory variables Dependent variable
Access
Lagged access 0,15534
(0,0072)***
Control of corruption 0,379693
(<.0001)***
Log Inflation 0,502203
(<.0001)***
Log Institutional development -1,8332
(0,0567)*
Log GDP -0,1213
(0,0007)***
Sargan Test 103,49
(0,9098)
AR(1) -1,89
(0,9703)
AR(2) -1,26
(0,8969)
No. of countries in each regression is 13.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
Significance levels of p -values are shown as 
*(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is 
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surprising since correlation between these two variables is high and positive. The model 
is identified due to Sargan test and no autocorrelation is reported.  
 
 
Table 5. Difference GMM estimation results for depth. 
 
 
6.3   Efficiency 
 
Control of corruption has also very significant effect on stock market turn-over ratio 
(efficiency) as can be seen from the Table 6. The sign of the coefficient is negative 
which is expected according to correlations but unexpected according to third 
Explanatory variables Depedent variable
Depth
Lagged depth 0,190813
(0,002)***
Control of corruption 0,194179
(0,0048)***
Log Inflation -0,72727
(0,0006)***
Log Institutional -0,10418
development (0,1923)
Log GDP 0,990767
(<.0001)***
Sargan Test 114,26
(0,7233)
AR(1) -0,2
(0,5776)
AR(2) -2,2
(0,986)
No. of countries in each regression is 13.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
Significance levels of p -values are shown 
as *(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is 
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hypothesis. Also lagged efficiency has explanatory power. It is surprising to notice that 
none of the control variables have significant effect on efficiency. Since selected control 
variables seem to be insufficient, different changes to set of control variables is made. 
Income, which was earlier omitted from the set because it was causing too many 
instruments in the estimation, is included now to the set of control variables. Then 
different combinations of control variables are made to test which set has the most 
explanatory power on stability. The results of these tests are not shown in this study to 
save space. All the combinations were bad in some way. One variable per estimation 
showed significance at 5% or lower level. The most successful results are given by the 
estimation where inflation is omitted and income, GDP and institutional development 
included in addition to control of corruption. The variables in this estimation are 
however significant at 10% level which is not that desirable result. Thus, finding more 
suitable control variables for turn-over ratio or changing the measure for efficiency is 
suggested for further studies. 
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Table 6. Difference GMM estimation results for efficiency  
 
 
6.4   Stability 
 
Table 7 shows insignificant effect of variable of interest on stock price volatility 
(stability). Of other variables only lagged stability and institutional development show 
significance. Since selected control variables seem to be insufficient, above mentioned 
changes to set of control variables is again made. The best combination is to omit 
inflation and replace it with income. The results are shown in Table 8. Control of 
Difference GMM estimates
Explanatory variables Dependent variable
Efficiency
Lagged efficiency 0,494841
(<.0001)***
Control of corruption -0,54057
(0,0011)***
Log Inflation -0,13456
(0,6065)
Log Institutional -0,27609
development (0,2398)
Log GDP -0,06189
(0,6417)
Sargan Test 128,92
(0,363)
AR(1) -3,11
(0,9991)
AR(2) -0,41
(0,6609)
No. of countries in each regression is 13.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
Significance levels of p -values are shown as 
*(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is 
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corruption has very significant and negative effect on volatility which is expected 
according to the fourth hypothesis. All the control variables show significance but the 
signs of the coefficient for GDP and institutional development are not as expected 
according to correlations. Even if financial market stability is generally expected to 
increase as the values of financial development determinants improve, opposite can be 
possible. As the Global Financial Development Report (2013: 37) shows, volatility in 
financial markets has increased between years 2008 and 2010 versus years 2000-2007. 
Thus, it might not be that surprising that for example institutional development, 
measured with domestic credit to private sector as a % of GDP, can forward volatility. 
Unsustainable lending, in the end, was the main reason for the financial crisis in 2007. 
 
 
Table 7. Difference GMM estimation results for stability – Income omitted and inflation 
included 
Difference GMM estimates
Explanatory variables Dependent variable
Stability
4
0,5092 Lagged stability 0,66257
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
0,241612 Control of corruption -0,06587
(0,0206)** (0,4082)
Log Inflation 0,016797
(0,9144)
Log Institutional 0,426198
development (0,0041)***
Log GDP -0,12321
(0,1584)
161,15 Sargan Test 134,6
(0,1557) (0,2429)
-2,80 AR(1) -2,5
(0,9974) (0,9939)
-0,20 AR(2) -1,32
(0,5783) (0,907)
No. of countries in each regression is 13.
Significance levels of p -values are shown as 
*(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is 
Significance levels of p -values are shown as *(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is absent.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
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Table 8. Difference GMM estimation results for stability – Inflation omitted and income 
included. 
 
 
Overall, it seems that the effect of control of corruption is significant for all aspects of 
financial development although it seems to improve only access, depth and stability. For 
more robust results, multiple other GMM estimations are made. The results are 
presented in the next section.  
Difference GMM estimates
Explanatory variables Dependent variable
Stability
4
0,5092 Lagged stability 0,66257
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
0,241612 Control of corruption -0,06587
(0,0206)** (0,4082)
Log Inflation 0,016797
(0,9144)
Log Institutional 0,426198
development (0,0041)***
Log GDP -0,12321
(0,1584)
161,15 Sargan Test 134,6
(0,1557) (0,2429)
-2,80 AR(1) -2,5
(0,9974) (0,9939)
-0,20 AR(2) -1,32
(0,5783) (0,907)
No. of countries in each regression is 13.
Significance levels of p -values are shown as 
*(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is 
Significance levels of p -values are shown as *(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is absent.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
t i l
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6.5   Robustness tests 
 
In total of four GMM estimations are made for each dependent variable for robustness 
testing. Different estimations test if omitting some control variable and all of the control 
variables changes the significance of the variable of interest. This approach works as a 
robustness test. If control of corruption stays significant when one control variable at a 
time is omitted, it can be argued that control of corruption has an effect on financial 
development but it is complimented by control variables. If control of corruption stays 
significant when all the control variables are omitted, it can be argued that control of 
corruption individually has an effect on financial development.  
 
 
6.5.1   Access  
 
Table 9, column one shows that when inflation is omitted, the coefficient for control of 
corruption stays very significant and positive. Also, the effects of all the other variables 
stay significant, and GDP and institutional development become positive as expected. 
Also, when institutional development is omitted (column two) all the variables stay very 
significant and interestingly the coefficient GDP becomes negative again. Results in 
column three show that when GDP is omitted all the variables stay significant. The 
coefficient for institutional development becomes positive. Institutional development 
and GDP seem to suffer from Simpson’s paradox, a statistical problem where effect 
appears in some data groups but disappears or reverses with combination of groups 
(Pearl 2014). The three first models pass the Sargan and autocorrelation tests.  
 
In the model of last column, all the control variables are omitted. The amount of lags is 
changed from two to six to increase the amount of instruments since omitting all the 
control variables collapses the instrument amount. Model is identified and does not 
suffer from autocorrelation. Lagged access and control of corruption stay highly 
significant. The coefficients for control of corruption in all the regressions made show 
that control variables have complementary effect on it. The value of the coefficient for 
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control of corruption is clearly the highest when all the control variables are included. 
Thus, even if it seems that control of corruption individually has effect on financial 
access measured with market capitalization excluding top 10 companies to market 
capitalization, the control variables complement the effect. 
 
 
Table 9. Difference GMM robustness estimation results for access. 
 
 
 
 
Difference GMM estimates
Dependent variable Explanatory variables Dependent variable
Access Access
1 2 3 4
0,15534 Lagged access 0,183522 0,218566 0,130828 0,42694
(0,0072)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0,0016)*** (<.0001)***
0,379693 Control of corruption 0,136177 0,168352 0,069784 0,083781
(<.0001)*** (0,0003)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
0,502203 Log Inflation 0,441575 0,19909
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
-1,8332 Log Institutional 0,087605 0,008917
(0,0567)* development (0,0012)*** (0,7825)
-0,1213 Log GDP 0,058849 -0,13846
(0,0007)*** (<.0001)*** (0,0007)***
103,49 Sargan Test 145,43 133,92 121,94 149,67
(0,9098) (0,1022) (0,2766) (0,5607) (0,103)
-1,89 AR(1) -1,92 -1,89 -1,67 -2,26
(0,9703) (0,9728) (0,9709) (0,9524) (0,9881)
-1,26 AR(2) 0,33 0,2 0,16 1,14
(0,8969) (0,3719) (0,4191) (0,4351) (0,1263)
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is absent.
No. of countries in each regression is 13. No. of countries in each regression is 13.
Model in 4th column uses 6 lags.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
Significance levels of p -values are shown as 
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
Significance levels of p -values are shown as *(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
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6.5.2   Depth 
 
The results for depth (Table 10) are consistent for control of corruption when one 
control variable at a time is omitted. The sign of coefficient for control of corruption 
stays positive and significant. The effect of institutional development becomes 
significant and negative which is unexpected since the correlation between the variables 
is strong and positive. Inconsistency can only be seen with inflation when GDP is 
omitted. The effect of inflation becomes positive which is against expectations. In the 
third model, three lags are used since the model with two lags did not pass the Sargan 
test. The first model passes the Sargan test only in 1% level. Increasing the amount of 
lags from two to three does not improve the results, it makes the instrument amount too 
large. All the models pass the autocorrelation tests in second level which is more 
important, since it detects autocorrelation in levels. 
 
For the model in fourth column, where all the control variables are omitted, seven lags 
are used to cover proper amount of instruments. The coefficient for control of 
corruption stays positive and very significant and the value of it is actually highest in 
this regression. The model passes the Sargan and autocorrelation tests. All in all, it can 
be said that control of corruption individually has positive and significant effect on 
financial depth measured with stock market capitalization to GDP.  
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Table 10. Difference GMM robustness estimation results for depth. 
 
 
6.5.3   Efficiency 
 
Table 11 shows results of robustness tests for efficiency. Lagged dependent variable 
stays very significant through testing. The effect of control of corruption stays 
significant and negative in estimations where inflation or GDP is removed. However, 
the significance level drops from 1% to 5% level when GDP is removed. Coefficient for 
Difference GMM estimates
Depedent variable Explanatory variables Depedent variable
Depth Depth
1 2 3 4
0,190813 Lagged depth 0,447226 0,113429 0,635104 0,797195
(0,002)*** (<.0001)*** (0,034)** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
0,194179 Control of corruption 0,255483 0,226406 0,172538 0,23942
(0,0048)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0,0317)** (<.0001)***
-0,72727 Log Inflation -1,49892 0,581024
(0,0006)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
-0,10418 Log Institutional -0,42075 -0,4531
(0,1923) development (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
0,990767 Log GDP 0,482665 1,229454
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
114,26 Sargan Test 152,18 106,33 147,48 153,75
(0,7233) (0,0495)** (0,8854) (0,9779) (0,2739)
-0,2 AR(1) -1,81 3,03 -2,19 -2,27
(0,5776) (0,9652) (0,00121)*** (0,9859) (0,9884)
-2,2 AR(2) -2,2 -1,58 -2,58 -2,59
(0,986) (0,9861) (0,9429) (0,9951) (0,9952)
Model in 3rd column uses 3 lags. Model in 4th column uses 7 lags.
No. of countries in each regression is 13.
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is absent.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
Significance levels of p -values are shown 
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is 
No. of countries in each regression is 13.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
Significance levels of p -values are shown as *(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
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inflation becomes significant when institutional development or GDP is omitted. Also 
coefficient for institutional development becomes significant but surprisingly, negative. 
GDP has significant, and again negative effect on efficiency when institutional 
development is omitted. All the models are identified and they pass the autocorrelation 
tests. 
 
When only control of corruption is used as a regressor, the Sargan test is passed. Seven 
lags are used for this estimation. However, because the sign of the coefficient changes, 
the real effect of control of corruption on turnover ratio measuring efficiency stays 
unclear. As discussed in the previous section, it seems that the control variables used are 
not suitable for predicting changes in efficiency. The model omitting inflation and 
including income is giving the most significant results although still not favorable. This 
model is also used for robustness tests (estimations not showed in this study), but the 
results are as inconsistent as with the set of control variables used in Table 11. As stated 
in the previous result section for efficiency, finding more suitable control variables for 
turn-over ratio, or finding more suitable proxy for financial efficiency is left for further 
research.  
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Table 11. Difference GMM robustness estimation results for efficiency. 
 
 
6.5.4   Stability 
 
The results for stability are shown in table 12. The set of control variables differs from 
the one used in robustness tests for other dimensions (access, depth and efficiency). As 
stated in the previous result section for stability, appropriate set of control variables 
omits inflation and replaces it with income. The coefficient of control of corruption 
stays negative and significant through estimations, when one variable at a time is 
removed. Although the significance level is only 10% when income is omitted. It seems 
that control variables have complimentary effect on each other. Omitting income makes 
Difference GMM estimates
Explanatory variables Dependent variable
Efficiency
1 2 3 4
Lagged efficiency 0,517898 0,684057 0,603063 0,5092
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Control of corruption -0,49509 -0,0465 -0,26548 0,241612
(0,0006)*** (0,6654) (0,031)** (0,0206)**
Log Inflation 1,02649 0,529577
(0,0004)*** (0,0044)***
Log Institutional -0,12025 -0,62829
development (0,0405)** (0,0049)***
Log GDP -0,26524 -0,55568
(0,2511) (<.0001)***
Sargan Test 129,17 113,63 143,5 161,15
(0,381) (0,758) (0,1233) (0,1557)
AR(1) -3,33 -3,46 -2,97 -2,80
(0,9996) (0,9997) (0,9985) (0,9974)
AR(2) -0,38 -0,18 -0,24 -0,20
(0,6495) (0,5733) (0,5947) (0,5783)
No. of countries in each regression is 13.
Model in 4th column uses 7 lags.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
Significance levels of p -values are shown as *(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is absent.
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GDP insignificant and omitting GDP makes income and institutional development 
insignificant. Thus income has complimentary effect on GDP and GDP on income and 
institutional development. Control variables also have complimentary effect on control 
of corruption as can be seen from the fourth column. The effect of control of corruption 
becomes insignificant. All models pass the Sargan test and autocorrelation does not 
exist in any of the models. Results partly support the fourth hypothesis. Control of 
corruption has negative and significant effect on stock market volatility but the effect is 
supported by control variables. Control of corruption individually does not have effect 
on financial stability. 
 
 
Table 12. Difference GMM robustness estimation results for stability. 
Difference GMM estimates
Explanatory variables Dependent variable
Stability
1 2 3 4
Lagged stability 0,745976 0,819846 0,628307 0,589597
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Control of corruption -0,15574 -0,45142 -0,16891 -0,03743
(0,0504)* (<.0001)*** (0,0246)** (0,4166)
Log Income 1,76288 -0,05273
(0,0002)*** (0,636)
Log Institutional 0,775197 0,072519
development (<.0001)*** (0,4934)
Log GDP -0,05061 -0,47393
(0,1268) (0,0007)***
Sargan Test 132,4 117,02 156,43 158,91
(0,3082) (0,6821) (0,9307) (0,187)
AR(1) -2,47 -2,42 -2,43 -2,73
(0,9932) (0,9923) (0,9924) (0,9968)
AR(2) -1,39 -0,99 -1,25 -1,28
(0,9179) (0,8388) (0,895) (0,9001)
No. of countries in each regression is 13.
Model in 4th column uses 7 lags.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p -values.
Significance levels of p -values are shown as *(10%) **(5%) and ***(1%).
H0 for AR(1) and AR(2): Autocorrelation is absent.
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7   DISCUSSION 
 
The empirical results support hypotheses one and two stating that control of corruption 
has positive effect on financial access and depth. The effect of control of corruption on 
access is complemented by control variables, but the effect on depth is even stronger 
when all the control variables are excluded. Estimations for efficiency suffer from 
statistical problem called Simpson’s paradox. It argues that in empirical analysis, the 
statistical significance and sign of coefficient of variables changes with including and 
omitting other variables in the model. The results were so inconsistent that the effect of 
control of corruption on efficiency, measured with turn-over ratio, could not be 
interpreted. Regardless of changing the set of control variables, no impressing results 
were reported. Suggestion for future studies would be to use different proxies for 
financial efficiency or to choose control variables which are more suitable for predicting 
turn-over ratio. Using other proxies for measuring access, depth and stability would also 
be appropriate to strengthen the results of this study.  
 
The standard errors from two-step GMM estimation are downward biased (Roodman 
2009). Thus, to get more robust results, this has to be taken into account. Future studies 
about this subject can be improved by correcting the bias of standard errors. Roodman 
argues that difference GMM might perform poorly if past levels do not provide 
important information about future values, in other words, if they work as weak 
instruments. Thus, using another approach, system GMM might be appropriate as 
additional robustness test. It uses past changes to predict current levels. System GMM 
however uses more instruments than difference GMM so for using it, it would be 
appropriate to use larger number of countries to avoid over-identification. More 
countries and longer time-period could also provide more valid results.  
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8   CONCLUSION 
 
Numerous studies show that the level of corruption has both direct and indirect effect to 
the financial development. This study widens the base of studies focusing on the 
straight relationship of corruption and financial development. Since studies focusing on 
straight relationship of corruption and financial development observe financial 
development as a whole with one proxy variable, this study adds approach where 
financial system development is seen as multidimensional and where corruption can 
have different effect on each dimension. This study shows the effect of control of 
corruption on four dimensions of financial development; access, depth, efficiency and 
stability.  
 
The data for this study consists of 13 middle income countries and the time interval 
covers 15 years, from 2000 to 2014. The effect of control of corruption on financial 
development is empirically tested using, difference GMM estimation method. The 
estimation method accounts the most common problems related to panel data, country-
specific fixed effects and endogeneity of explanatory variables.  
 
The results support the first and the second hypothesis stating that control of corruption 
has very significant and positive effect on financial access and depth. For depth, the 
effect stays persistently through robustness tests and even strengthens when all the 
control variables are omitted. Thus, the effect of control of corruption on financial depth 
does not rely on the complimentary effect of control variables. The effect for access also 
stays persistently through robustness tests but is complemented by control variables. 
The significance of all the control variables is also persistent through estimations except 
for institutional development on access when GDP is omitted. The effect of institutional 
development on depth is surprisingly significant and negative in robustness tests which 
is unexpected since the correlation between the variables is strong and positive. As a 
conclusion, it can be said that control of corruption has positive and significant effect on 
financial depth, measured with stock market capitalization to GDP, and on access, 
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measured with market capitalization excluding top 10 companies to market 
capitalization. 
 
For financial efficiency results are harder to interpret because the sign of the coefficient 
changes when all the control variables are omitted. The real effect of control of 
corruption on efficiency stays unclear. It also seems that the control variables used are 
not suitable for predicting changes in turn-over ratio. Different combinations of control 
variables presented in this study are used to find more suitable set, but none of the made 
estimations (not showed in this study) showed significant and consistent results. Finding 
more suitable control variables for turn-over ratio, or finding more suitable proxy for 
financial efficiency is left for further research.  
 
The set of control variables is changed for estimations on stability since the ones used 
for other dimensions are not appropriate for predicting volatility in stock markets. 
Appropriate set of control variables omits inflation and includes income but is otherwise 
the same. The results support the fourth hypothesis partly. The coefficient of control of 
corruption stays negative and significant through estimations, when one variable at a 
time is removed, although the significance level is only 10% when income is omitted. 
Control variables seem to have complimentary effect on control of corruption since the 
effect of it becomes insignificant when all the control variables are omitted.  
 
To find support for the results for access, depth and stability alternative proxies for them 
can be used. Also, the standard errors from two-step GMM estimation are downward 
biased so to get more robust results, this has to be taken into account. Further suggestion 
is to use system GMM as an estimation method. It can work as an additional robustness 
test if enough data is found for more that 13 countries used in this study. In addition, 
using longer time period is recommended if enough data exists since it adds reliability 
on the results. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 (1/2). Variables used to construct measure for control of corruption (World 
Bank 2016). 
    Control of Corruption 
      
Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. This table lists the individual variables from 
each data sources used to construct this measure in the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
  
Code   Concept Measured 
      
Representative Sources 
EIU   Corruption among public officials 
GCS   Public Trust in Politicians 
    Diversion of Public Funds 
    Irregular Payments in Export and Import 
    Irregular Payments in Public Utilities 
    Irregular payments in tax collection 
    Irregular Payments in Public Contracts 
    Irregular Payments in Judicial Decisions 
    State Capture 
GWP   Is corruption in governmnent widespread? 
IPD   Level of "petty" corruption between administration and citizens 
    Level of corruption between administrations and local businesses 
    Level of corruption between administrations and foreign companies 
PRS   Corruption 
WMO 
  
Corruption. The risk that individuals/companies will face bribery or other corrupt practices to carry out business, from securing major 
contracts to being allowed to import/export a small product or obtain everyday paperwork. This threatens a company's ability to 
operate in a country, or opens it up to legal or regulatory penalties and reputational damage.  
      
Non-representative Sources 
ADB   Transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector 
AFR   How many elected leaders (parliamentarians) do you think are involved in corruption? 
    How many judges and magistrates do you think are involved in corruption? 
    How many government officials do you think are involved in corruption? 
    How many border/tax officials do you think are involved in corruption? 
ASD   Transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector 
BPS   How common is it for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done? 
    Percentage of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials? 
    How often do firms make extra payments in connection with taxes, customs, and judiciary? 
    How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business? 
BTI   Anti-Corruption policy 
    Prosecution of office abuse 
CCR   Anti-Corruption and Transparency 
FRH   Corruption (FNT) 
GCB   Frequency of household bribery - paid a bribe to one of the 8/9 services 
    Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Political parties 
    Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Parliament/Legislature 
    Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Media 
    Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Legal system/Judiciary 
    Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Public officials 
GII   Accountability 
IFD   Accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas 
LBO   Frequency of corruption 
PIA   Transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector 
PRC   To what extent does corruption exist in a way that detracts from the business environment for foreign companies? 
VAB   Frequency of corruption among government officials 
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Appendix 1 (2/2). Variables used to construct measure for control of corruption (World 
Bank 2016). 
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Appendix 2 (1/5). Descriptive statistics – Country level 
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 15 48,2586 2,5553 44,3948 53,8000
Depth 15 47,9408 14,6252 26,9829 77,0581
Efficiency 15 52,7222 15,2587 28,7274 75,6877
Stability 15 29,7139 7,5460 21,3019 48,4423
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,0320 0,0988 -0,1700 0,1457
Inflation 15 87,5663 22,7811 52,5424 126,9258
Income 15 5101,7200 583,2004 4385,9100 5926,8800
Log GDP 15 27,8061 0,6350 26,9177 28,5865
Institutional 
development 15 43,5401 14,3782 14,3782 67,0925
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 14 74,9760 7,1282 60,5912 85,6823
Depth 15 44,9627 17,7987 18,8240 80,6027
Efficiency 15 154,1942 66,6147 67,6930 290,9728
Stability 15 24,6852 7,2135 17,3143 40,9980
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,5134 0,1171 -0,6537 -0,2405
Inflation 15 93,0124 12,1203 79,0236 113,2250
Income 15 2300,7400 917,5077 1127,7300 3862,9200
Log GDP 15 28,8705 0,7609 27,8133 29,9336
Institutional 
development 15 120,2009 11,1788 102,8060 141,8740
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 12 29,5641 10,3932 18,1782 51,5474
Depth 15 36,8621 20,5863 9,8877 64,4365
Efficiency 15 12,1953 7,7486 2,4707 29,3200
Stability 13 20,5836 6,0068 12,9179 33,5245
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,2640 0,1278 -0,4385 -0,0984
Inflation 15 87,2230 17,6064 58,2116 111,9878
Income 15 3713,6700 547,1580 3036,7700 4657,7500
Log GDP 15 25,9362 0,5405 25,2341 26,6368
Institutional 
development 15 36,0471 10,4563 20,9475 52,7273
Colombia
Descriptive statistics - Per country
Brazil
China
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Appendix 2 (2/5). Descriptive statistics – Country level 
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 14 67,4010 6,5455 53,1237 76,8187
Depth 15 61,2264 24,4414 22,8935 109,8937
Efficiency 15 109,6931 70,0834 46,6669 313,1811
Stability 15 24,8350 7,7663 15,8078 43,7410
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,4522 0,0869 -0,5728 -0,2967
Inflation 15 84,8651 28,6718 54,1609 140,3594
Income 15 854,1825 221,7006 572,0590 1233,9500
Log GDP 15 27,6640 0,5250 26,8760 28,3242
Institutional 
development 15 42,2053 9,1062 27,8511 51,8707
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 15 50,1662 5,3085 42,5070 59,4098
Depth 15 30,6342 10,2320 14,0077 43,2702
Efficiency 15 36,8709 10,5626 23,1465 56,5357
Stability 15 23,7260 5,2550 17,1821 35,7509
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,7853 0,1653 -1,1339 -0,5627
Inflation 15 82,6764 25,7769 44,0200 124,3863
Income 15 1409,0600 258,4805 1072,6900 1853,8100
Log GDP 15 26,7005 0,6770 25,6649 27,5145
Institutional 
development 15 26,9964 5,2028 19,9085 36,5169
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 15 63,2067 1,6212 59,8000 66,9391
Depth 15 132,7191 10,3292 115,3071 148,5357
Efficiency 15 31,4949 8,2813 18,1396 53,7903
Stability 15 13,8804 5,6868 7,7721 27,0027
Control of 
corruption 13 0,2359 0,1518 -0,0312 0,4257
Inflation 15 93,8176 10,0110 80,4614 110,4833
Income 15 5925,1400 818,0761 4784,8700 7365,2400
Log GDP 15 25,8720 0,4917 25,1776 26,5224
Institutional 
development 15 113,8051 10,4712 96,7484 135,0000
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
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Appendix 2 (3/5). Descriptive statistics – Country level  
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 15 36,3818 5,9484 23,0557 47,8577
Depth 15 28,7357 9,5751 15,0516 42,3583
Efficiency 15 28,1873 4,9627 21,4998 41,8915
Stability 15 21,8078 6,9131 13,8559 35,3646
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,2971 0,0924 -0,4760 -0,1521
Inflation 15 88,6450 16,7346 63,3150 116,2480
Income 15 8019,4500 344,8016 7529,0600 8521,8900
Log GDP 15 27,5495 0,2203 27,2305 27,8934
Institutional 
development 15 21,0276 5,8532 13,4464 30,9867
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 15 37,7516 5,1302 27,2121 45,3829
Depth 15 37,7244 14,3827 18,9768 60,6541
Efficiency 15 8,0845 4,5532 3,4844 20,3055
Stability 15 21,2567 8,8142 11,2108 42,8908
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,3046 0,1056 -0,4866 -0,1001
Inflation 15 93,6168 11,3953 79,1623 113,7194
Income 15 3129,8200 645,6369 2329,0000 4123,5800
Log GDP 15 25,2739 0,5037 24,6353 25,9703
Institutional 
development 15 24,5732 4,6924 17,9130 34,0287
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 15 47,3471 9,9668 34,9174 62,3265
Depth 15 50,0400 21,6910 24,3105 82,8716
Efficiency 15 17,2273 4,4227 10,8203 27,3057
Stability 15 21,7498 4,3592 17,3644 31,4041
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,6271 0,1387 -0,8087 -0,4034
Inflation 15 87,9493 17,4144 63,6169 115,8022
Income 15 1299,0500 193,6690 1056,7900 1662,0700
Log GDP 15 25,8829 0,4984 25,2231 26,5812
Institutional 
development 15 32,6190 3,5564 28,6940 39,1509
Philippines
Mexico
Peru
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Appendix 2 (4/5). Descriptive statistics – Country level 
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 14 66,7402 10,7701 50,7968 80,2466
Depth 15 199,1955 42,9420 129,6691 256,4981
Efficiency 15 27,8126 4,7690 18,8565 34,1278
Stability 15 19,4892 5,2679 13,3794 34,3760
Control of 
corruption 13 0,2451 0,2520 -0,1653 0,6121
Inflation 15 85,8089 22,0172 55,9338 124,4293
Income 15 5601,8100 471,0661 4854,3900 6090,3000
Log GDP 15 26,2293 0,4382 25,4237 26,7394
Institutional 
development 15 139,9823 14,0855 110,7180 160,1250
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 15 55,5199 6,0451 44,2770 63,1354
Depth 15 18,6125 7,5995 7,2718 30,6562
Efficiency 15 17,9180 8,0488 8,5408 34,2028
Stability 15 18,5996 5,9843 9,0866 32,2115
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,2575 0,0964 -0,3992 -0,0977
Inflation 15 78,4702 31,2668 36,4800 126,7203
Income 15 1449,0700 342,8863 1051,7600 2045,8600
Log GDP 15 24,2089 0,5599 23,4313 25,0137
Institutional 
development 15 28,5928 3,0388 23,2586 33,9736
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 15 55,3291 3,3231 50,6728 62,6301
Depth 15 61,4723 20,6388 26,0885 95,3629
Efficiency 15 83,5465 19,2861 46,3066 125,8369
Stability 15 23,3553 5,5164 15,8784 35,4947
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,2705 0,1006 -0,4199 -0,1013
Inflation 15 92,9342 11,8021 77,3340 111,3507
Income 15 3068,9300 485,6908 2316,8200 3768,7900
Log GDP 15 26,1526 0,4413 25,5108 26,7147
Institutional 
development 15 110,6806 19,3526 88,9066 146,8190
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Thailand
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Appendix 2 (5/5). Descriptive statistics – Country level 
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Access 15 51,8159 12,0481 43,9000 92,8366
Depth 15 27,1209 5,9093 16,6714 37,3464
Efficiency 15 161,9588 27,2874 106,4797 218,4883
Stability 15 36,2736 13,4818 22,3167 64,3352
Control of 
corruption 13 -0,0657 0,2427 -0,7101 0,1672
Inflation 15 78,9384 34,4021 19,2795 135,6614
Income 15 7348,3600 1046,7800 5679,9400 8864,7400
Log GDP 15 26,9267 0,4988 25,9703 27,4203
Institutional 
development 15 35,6249 20,5689 14,5213 74,6374
Turkey
